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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the great strengths of the common law is its ability to adapt
to a changing legal environment. Its flexibility allows courts to weave
from ancient doctrines new rules to resolve problems as they arise in an
increasingly complex society. Occasionally the courts' handiwork be-
comes so entangled in confused definitions and internal inconsistencies,
and travels so far from a doctrine's original rationale, that it cries out for
reform. Such is the case with joint and several liability.
The doctrine of joint and several liability works to hold any one of
multiple tortfeasors liable to a plaintiff for the entire harm caused by
their combined acts.I This doctrine applies even when the trier of fact
determines that an individual tortfeasor's proportionate share of fault is
slight.2 Thus, theoretically a party found one percent at fault can be
held liable for the entire amount of damages awarded.
As a result of this shortcoming, plaintiffs often target persons they
perceive to have the greatest resources from which to pay claims. Com-
monly known as "deep-pocket" defendants, they are especially likely to
be brought into a suit when it appears that the party most responsible
for the harm is judgment-proof.
3
Some argue that the deep pocket abuse is curtailed effectively
through the common law rule requiring that a party be determined
to have been a "legal cause"4 of the harm in order for liability to attach. 5
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977); Prosser,Joint Torts and Several
Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 413, 418 (1937); Jackson,Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX.
L. REV. 399, 404 (1939); Recent Developments, Torts-Joint Tortfeasors-Liability and Contri-
bution for Indivisible Injury, 45 TENN. L. REV. 129 (1977) (citing Velsicol Chemical Corp. v.
Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976)); W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS § 47, at 328 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
2. 86 C.J.S. Torts § 34 (1956 & Cum. Supp. 1985); see also Rozevink v. Faris, 342
N.W.2d 845 (Iowa 1983) (defendant adjudicated to be seventeen percent negligent was
jointly liable for entire amount of damages); Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of
New York, 103 Misc. 2d 60, 425 N.Y.S. 2d 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), 81 A.D.2d 755, 438
N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, O'Connor v. City of New York,
58 N.Y.2d 184, 447 N.E.2d 33, 460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. 1983) (defendant adjudicated to be
four percent at fault was required to pay entire judgment for personal injuries).
3. It has been argued that "[d]efendants are brought into a lawsuit not so much
because [they are] responsible in a practical sense. They are brought in because of their
deep pockets." Executive Session No. 20 of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 12, 1986) (Statement of Senator Pressler).
4. "There is perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of confusion" than the issue
of "proximate cause" or "legal cause." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41, at 263.
Generally speaking, once it has been established that an act or omission is a "cause in fact"
of a harm, an additional legal test must be met before liability attaches. That test requires
"that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant
and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered." Id. It "is merely the limitation which the
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However, this rule has proved ineffective because typically it has re-
quired little more than an indirect contributory role. 6 Because the chain
of causation becomes tenuous at best in these cases, 7 this approach has
been criticized. 8
The thesis of this article is that the doctrine of joint and several
liability should be refined to accommodate the current law on joint torts
and to reflect the original policy goals underlying its common law ori-
gins. The purpose of this article is to assist the reformer in identifying
the various issues which should be addressed in any reform proposal, to
discuss and develop the theoretical and policy rationale for reform, and
to recommend specific reforms. This article will critically examine the
courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's con-
duct." Id. at 264. Historically, this has been termed as "proximate cause," although Pros-
ser prefers the "more appropriate term" of "legal cause." Id. at 273. Despite concerns
over semantic purity, the two terms are used synonymously. Id. at 263.
5. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41, at 264.
6. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Sills v. City of Los Angeles, C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14,
1985). In Sills, a driver high on drugs collided with another automobile as he ran a stop
sign. The city was found to have jointly caused the accident because it failed to trim the
hedges near the intersection. The driver was insolvent and the city was required to pay
almost all of the $2.16 million judgment.
Duggan v. City of San Diego, No. 484152 (San Diego Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1984). In
Duggan, a drunk driver smashed into a car with three passengers as he crossed the center
line on a curve. The City of San Diego was joined as a defendant based on a claim that the
accident was "caused" by a faulty road design. The drunk driver settled for $25,000. Af-
ter initial court proceedings, the city settled for $1.6 million.
Laurenti v. Tiffenbauch, No. A-6247-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984) (on
appeal from N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.). In Laurenti, a "chopped" motorcycle collided with a
full-size automobile when it was unable to stop in time to avoid the oncoming automobile
making a left-hand turn in front of it. A passenger on the motorcycle was wearing a large
metal belt buckle. Upon impact the passenger came forward and forced the belt buckle
into the driver's back, resulting in a serious injury. Among others, the driver named Rayco
of Trenton, Inc. as a defendant, alleging that Rayco, who had reupholstered the seat, had
stretched the material too tight making the seat "excessively slippery." The plaintiff al-
leged that this act had "caused" the injury and the lower court agreed. Before trial, the
driver of the automobile settled for her insurance policy limit of $25,000. Other defend-
ants named had little or no assets and thus Rayco became liable for the balance of the $2.5
million verdict plus $900,000 in interest. After an appeal was filed and briefed, the case
was settled for $1.1 million. For an extensive narrative of this case, see Availability and Cost
of Liability Insurance.- Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 67-68 (1986) (statement of Mr. Bradford W. Mitchell) [hereinafter
1986 Insurance Hearings).
Cini v. Vaughn, No. A893-81T1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 1983) (on appeal
from N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Atlantic County, No. L-17175-78). In Cini, the plaintiff was
injured when defendant Vaughn fell asleep behind the wheel on the expressway, allowing
his car to veer off the road and collide with a tow truck that was parked on the shoulder of
the road to assist a disabled vehicle. The plaintiff alleged that the tow truck, parked ap-
proximately ten feet behind the disabled vehicle with its lights flashing, was "improper[ly]
locat[ed]." The tow truck owner was named one of the numerous defendants. The sleep-
ing driver settled for his insurance policy limit of $30,000. After an initial summary judg-
ment for the defendant tow truck owner was reversed, the owner settled for $242,500. See
Claim No. A50-11 22 06-R, Harleysville Insurance Companies, Harleysville, Pennsylvania
(settlement figures relating to the tow truck owner). Two other named defendants - The
Atlantic City Expressway Authority and the architect of the expressway - also settled after
the reversal of the summary judgment.
8. See generally Product Liability Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consumer of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter 1986
Product Liability Hearings].
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
theories and justifications underlying the ancient common law doctrine
ofjoint torts. It will apply them to today's legal setting by focusing on
relatively recent common law developments such as the advent of com-
parative fault 9 and alternative liability, 10 and illustrate the need for
change. Finally, the article will discuss how joint and several liability
reform can (1) lead to more equitable results in the majority of cases; (2)
punish the true wrongdoers; and (3) eliminate a great deal of uncer-
tainty in the law of joint torts.
II. BACKGROUND
The current insurance "crisis"I' has given joint and several liability
reformers new impetus. Joint and several liability has been named by
the insurance industry and other deep-pocket defendants as one of the
leading culprits in causing skyrocketing liability insurance premiums.12
Local governments have cited it as a reason for increasing taxes and
eliminating public facilities and services. 13 Because of their deep pock-
ets, public entities, particularly municipalities, are often brought into
suits for their passive roles in "causing" accidents. For example, cities
have been held responsible for virtually the entire damages in million-
9. For a discussion of comparative fault, see infra notes 68-76 and accompanying
text.
10. For a discussion of alternative liability, see infra notes 80-83 and accompanying
text.
11. Although there has been a substantial amount of discussion as to whether recent
developments within the insurance industry constitute a "crisis," the present problems in
obtaining affordable insurance coverage have been often referred to as such. See generally
Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Busi-
ness, Trade, and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Insurance Hearings]; 1986 Insurance Hearings, supra
note 7; The Cost and Availability of Liability Insurance for Small Business Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Small Business, 99th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1985, 1986) [hereinafter Small Business
Insurance Hearings].
12. Report of the Committee on Municipal Tort Liability of the National Institute of Municipal
Law Officers, pp. 38-42, Annual Conference, Fort Worth, Texas (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter
Report on Municipal Liability]; American Insurance Association Memorandum from Dennis
R. Connolly, Vice President for Liability, to all Regional Vice Presidents (Nov. 12, 1985)
[hereinafter AIA Memorandum] ("The elimination ofjoint liability... is perhaps the most
single [sic] important across-the-board tort reform"); Letter from Leslie Cheek, Vice Presi-
dent of Federal Affairs, Crum & Forster Insurance Companies to Senator Larry Pressler
(March 10, 1986) (abrogation ofjoint and several liability "would remove the single most
serious common law impediment to the underwriting and pricing of product liability insur-
ance"). See generally 1986 Product Liability Hearings, supra note 8; 1986 Insurance Hearings,
supra note 7 (these records are replete with evidence of the problems caused by the joint
and several liability doctrine).
It should be noted that opponents of tort reform strongly disagree as to the causes of
insurance premium increases, citing reasons such as poor industry underwriting practices,
the cyclical nature of the insurance industry, and an insurance industry conspiracy to dra-
matically raise prices in an attempt to gain long-coveted tort reform. 1986 Insurance Hear-
ings, supra note 7. There is insufficient evidence to unequivocally support any of these
competing theories. It is the writers' opinion that the insurance problem is a result of a
combination of the factors referred to above. And, although it is doubtful the insurance
industry is engaged in a conscious conspiracy to raise prices in an effort to prompt tort
reform, at the very least it appears that the industry is taking advantage of the "crisis" in its
push for reform and using it to deflect criticisms of its own contributions to the problem.
13. See Report on Municipal Liability, supra note 12, at 35-38.
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dollar awards because they have failed to trim hedges on private prop-
erty, "causing" a vehicle whose driver was high on drugs to collide at an
intersection equipped with stop signs; 14 because they have located a
street light too close to the curb, "causing" injury upon impact when a
driver veered off the road and ran into a light pole; 15 because their traf-
fic lanes were too narrow, "causing" a collision between negligent driv-
ers; 16 because they failed to place warning signs along a beachfront
during the off-season, "causing" injury to a man who ran into the surf
and dove into shallow water, hitting his head on a sandbar and leaving
him a quadraplegic. 17
As long as the plaintiff can convince the trier of fact that the deep-
pocket defendant was a contributing factor in bringing about the injury,
and thereby a legal cause,' 8 the doctrine of joint and several liability
potentially exposes it to entire liability. Although juries commonly find
that the deep pocket's responsibility for the harm caused is very slight,
often only a few percentage points, 19 this is sufficient to establish liabil-
ity for the entire judgment. Although deep-pocket defendants have a
right of contribution against the remaining defendants, those parties are
often insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof
2 0
The issue ofjoint and several liability has received extensive debate
14. Sills v. City of Los Angeles, C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1985).
The plaintiff argued that the city should have installed signs to warn of the upcoming stop
signs. The jury returned a verdict of $2.16 million. The negligent driver had no money
and three other co-defendants settled for their insurance policy limits, a total of $200,000,
leaving the city to pay the balance.
15. Isom v. City of Antioch, No. 225117 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1984).
The plaintiff argued that the light should have been mounted on a break-away pole. The
city pointed out that break-away poles also have created municipal liability for the damage
caused when they fall. However, because of the joint and several liability law, the City of
Antioch settled the case in 1984 for $400,000.
16. Anderson v. City of Signal Hill, No. SOC-60893 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1984). The jury returned a verdict of $1.5 million against the city and two negli-
gent drivers also involved in the case. The two drivers' policy limits totalled $115,000,
leaving the city responsible for the balance of $1.385 million. The city later settled the
case for $400,000 and monthly payments of $4,000 over the next 10 years, plus additional
payments to related parties in excess of$10,000 per month for varying time periods. The
city was held liable because it had restriped the traffic lanes six years earlier making them
10 feet wide - a width accepted as safe in the state highway authority's CALTRANS traffic
manual.
17. Taylor v. City of Newport Beach, No. 354623 (Orange County Super. Ct. October
29, 1984). The city was ordered to pay $6 million. Shortly after the verdict, the city's
insurance coverage was cancelled.
18. For a discussion of legal cause, see supra note 4; see also infra note 135 and accom-
panying text.
19. See, e.g., Gannon Personnel Agency, Inc. v. City of New York, 103 Misc. 2d 60, 425
N.Y.S.2d 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), 81 A.D.2d 755, 438 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981), rev'd on other grounds, O'Connor v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 184,447 N.E.2d 33,
460 N.Y.S.2d 485 (N.Y. 1983) (city adjudicated only four percent at fault but held liable
for the entire judgment); see also Report on Municipal Liability, supra note 12, at 30-38.
20. Indeed, it is often argued that the primary reason a public entity is brought into
the suit in the first place is because the defendants most responsible are judgment-proof.
See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LIABILITY
REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70-71 (1986) (majority views); 1985
Insurance Hearings, supra note 11, at 155-57 (statement of Mr. Quinn, vice president of the
Maryland Municipal League, urging repeal of the doctrine of joint and several liability).
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at the federal level for the first time since uniform product liability legis-
lation was introduced seven years ago. 2 1 Efforts are now being made by
federal legislators to limit the doctrine.2 2 The Reagan Administration
has urged complete repeal except in cases involving "concerted ac-
tion". 2 3 The most recent product liability bill reported by the Senate
Commerce Committee contains an amendment abrogating joint and
several liability for noneconomic damages.
2 4
Also, many states have begun to focus on the issue ofjoint and sev-
eral liability. Twelve years ago, joint and several liability was universally
applied in every state. 25 Since then, however, at least thirty-three
states2 6 have either abolished 2 7 or substantially limited 28 joint and sev-
21. See H.R. 1061, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 1676, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). Early product liability legislation did not focus on the issue of joint and several
liability. Cf. infra notes 22-24. But with the convergence of the general liability insur-
ance/tort reform and product liability issues, joint and several liability became a major
element in the product liability hearings during the 99th Congress. See, e.g., 1986 Product
Liability Hearings, supra note 8 (joint and several liability amendment proposal discussed
February 27 at p. 6 and identified as the "one tort reform that would do the most to
improve the availability and affordability of liability insurance," February 27, at p. 14. Spe-
cific joint and several liability amendment filed March 11, at p. 210).
22. The early federal product liability and tort reform legislation, although generally
including some type of contribution provision, did not attempt to abrogate or substantially
limit joint and several liability. See, e.g., H.R. 1061, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R.
7000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 44, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985); see also S. 2046, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (would abolish joint and several liabil-
ity for noneconomic damages); Pressler Amendment to S. 1999, 1986 Product Liability Hear-
ings, supra note 8, at 210 (would abolish joint and several liability in all product liability
actions except for cases involving concerted action; the amendment was debated, but no
vote was taken); Pressler Amendment to Committee Working Draft, Executive Session No. 20
of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 12,
1986) (would limit joint and several liability to economic damages in product liability ac-
tions); see generally Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implica-
tions of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, Depts. of Justice and
Commerce, at 64 (February 1986) [hereinafter Administration Report] (Recommendation
No. 3 urges abolition of joint and several liability except for cases involving concerted
action).
23. Administration Report, supra note 22. Concerted action is discussed infra notes 43-44
and accompanying text.
24. S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 308 (1986) (Section 308 was added to the original
Committee bill as an amendment. Section 308(c) defines noneconomic damages as
subjective, nonmonetary losses including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, in-
convenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of society and companion-
ship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation; the term does not
include objectively verifiable monetary losses including, but not limited to, medi-
cal expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair
or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, rehabilitation and
training expenses, loss of employment or loss of business or employment
opportunities.)
25. Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A.J. 61, 62 (July 1985).
26. See infra notes 27 (three states abrogated prior to 1986), 28 (nine states modified
prior to 1986), 29 (fifteen states abrogated or modified in 1986), 30 (one state modified by
1986 referendum) and 31 (ten states abrogated or modified in 1987). The reader will note
that of the thirty-eight states referred to in this footnote, five states - Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nevada, New Mexico and Texas - enacted joint and several liability legislation or
decided joint and several liability court cases in successive years. Therefore, a total of
thirty-three states have either abrogated or substantially modified joint and several liability
laws in recent years.
27. In 1986, Colorado, Utah and Wyoming abrogated joint and several liability. See
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eral liability. In 1986 alone, fifteen state legislatures enacted joint and
several liability reform laws. 29 Additionally during 1986, voters in Cali-
infra note 29. North Dakota followed in 1987. See infra note 31. Additionally, Kansas,
Ohio and New Mexico abrogated joint and several liability prior to 1986.
Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978) (abolished joint and several liability through
interpretation of a 1976 comparative negligence statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-258a, 60-
258b (1983)); see also Ebeling v. General Motors Corp., No. 57,700 (Kan. Feb. 21, 1986).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (Anderson 1981) (abolished the rule in favor
of several liability); Steams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 770 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1985);
Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985); Wilfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E.2d
1185 (Ohio 1983); see also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 16.4, at 258-59 (2d
ed. 1986).
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. 1982) (abolished the
rule in favor of several liability through interpretation of a state supreme court decision,
Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981), which earlier adopted comparative negligence).
But see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-3-1 at infra note 31. It remains to be seen how the New
Mexico courts will interpret the "public policy" exception of the 1987 statute in light of
Bartlett.
It should be noted that in addition to the statutes and decision just mentioned, a 1981
New Hampshire comparative negligence statute, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (1983),
appeared to have completely abrogated joint and several liability. The statutory language
appears to have abolished the rule in favor of several liability, but thus far the courts have
not decided the issue. However, given the 1986 New Hampshire modified joint and sev-
eral liability statute cited infra note 29, this now seems an unlikely result.
Finally, while some thought that Vermont's comparative negligence statute, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1981), abolished the rule in favor of several liability, see Granelli, supra
note 25, at 62, which suggests the Vermont courts seem to have held otherwise. English v.
Meyers, 142 Vt. 144, 454 A.2d 251 (1982); see also V. SCHWARTZ, supra § 16.4, at 259.
28. As discussed infra notes 29-30, Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Washington, West Virginia
and California substantially modified joint and several liability in 1986. Nine others fol-
lowed in 1987 - Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
South Dakota and Texas. In addition to these twenty-two states, nine others - Indiana,
Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Texas - sub-
stantially modified joint and several liability prior to 1986.
Nevada, Texas, Indiana, Louisiana, Oregon and Pennsylvania all limited the rule so
that it applies only when plaintiff's negligence is less than defendants'. Several liability
applies when plaintiff's negligence is greater than defendants'. NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.141(3) (1986); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-33-5 (Burns 1986); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2324 (West 1972); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.485 (1985); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1982); General State
Auth. v. Sutter Corp., 452 A.2d 75 (N.Y. 1982) (reform via court decision rather than
through legislation).
Iowa limited the rule so it would not apply to defendants found to bear less than fifty
percent of total fault assigned to all parties, leaving them liable for their several amount.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 668.1-668.3, 619.17 (West Supp. 1987).
Minnesota limited the rule only insofar as the share of an uncollectable defendant's
damages would be reallocated among all others, including a partially negligent plaintiff.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01(1) (West Supp. 1987).
Oklahoma limited the rule to cases where damages cannot be apportioned or where
plaintiff is not at fault. Boyles v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980);
Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071 (Okla. 1978).
29. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming all
enacted legislation during the 1986 session to abrogate or substantially modify the doc-
trine of joint and several liability.
Of the fifteen states, three enacted an outright abrogation: COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2 1-
111.5 (Cum. Supp. 1986) ("[N]o defendant shall be liable for an amount greater than that
represented by the degree or percentage of the negligence or fault attributable to such
defendant."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78 27-38 (Supp. 1986) ("[N]o defendant is liable to any
person seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to
that defendant."); Wvo. STAT. § 1-l-109(d) (Cum. Supp. 1986) ("Each defendant is liable
19881
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fornia approved an initiative measure abolishing the doctrine as it per-
only for that portion of the total dollar amount [correlating to] the percentage of fault
attributable to him as determined by the jury.").
The remaining twelve states enacted substantial modifications: ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.080 (Cum. Supp. 1986) ("[A] party who is allocated less than 50 percent of the
total fault allocated to all parties [including plaintiff] may not be jointly liable for more
than twice the percentage of fault allocated to that party." § 09.17.080 (d)); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-572h (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("[E]ach person against whom recovery is allowed
shall be liable to the claimant only for his proportionate share of the recoverable ...
damages .. .except [that when] damages [are] uncollectable [the court] shall reallocate
such uncollectable amount among the other parties according to their respective percent-
ages."); FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Cum. Supp. 1987) (Liability of each party is determined "on
the basis of such party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint
and several liability [except for] economic damages [in cases where the defendant's] fault
equals or exceeds that of [the] claimant."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9 (Supp. 1986)
("Joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors [whose 'degree of negligence is less than
twenty-five percent'] .. .is abolished" for noneconomic damages except in actions involv-
ing environmental pollution, asbestos-related and toxic torts, intentional torts, strict and
products liability, and aircraft and certain motor vehicle accidents.); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, paras. 2-1117, 2-1118 (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("Any defendant whose fault.., is less than
25% of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and
any third party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be severally
liable for all ...damages" other than medically related expenses. § 2-1117. However,
joint and several liability is retained in medical malpractice and environmental cases. § 2-
1118.); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6304 (West 1987) ("In a personal injury action
involving fault of more than 1 party... a person shall not be required to pay damages in
an amount greater than his or her percentage of fault." § 600.6304(1) & (5). However, if
the court determines that "all or part of a party's share of the obligation is uncollectible,"
it "shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties according to their
respective percentages of fault" not to exceed "that party's percentage of fault."
§ 600.6304(6). In addition, joint and several liability is retained in "a products liability
action," § 600.6304(4), and in cases where "a plaintiff is not at fault," § 600.6304(3)).
MINN. STAT. § 604.02 (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("[T]he state or a municipality [whose] fault is
less than 35 percent ... is jointly and severally liable for an amount no greater than twice
the amount of fault.") (See also MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (West Supp. 1987), supra note 28.);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 538.230(2) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1987) ("defendant ['health care pro-
vider'] ... jointly liable only with those defendants whose apportioned percentage of fault
is equal to or less than such defendant"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-B:9 (Cum. Supp.
1986) ("[G]overnmental units or public employees shall be liable only to the extent that
their acts or omissions contributed to the causation" of harm "arising from a pollutant
incident" if that fault is less than fifty percent of the total.); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R 1601,
1602 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1987) ("[I]n an action involving two or more tortfeasors ...
or in a claim against the state [where] the liability of a defendant is found to be fifty per-
cent or less of the total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of such defend-
ant . . . for non-economic loss shall not exceed that defendant's equitable share
determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each person causing or contribut-
ing to the total liability for non-economic loss." § 1601. But § 1601 does not apply to
intentional torts, actions taken in concert, workers' compensation cases, or administrative
proceedings. § 1602.); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("The liability of
each defendant shall be several only and shall not be joint" if the action involves fault of
more than one party - except in cases involving concerted action, hazardous waste sites,
business torts, and manufacturers of fungible products.); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-9 (Cune.
Supp. 1987) (eliminates joint and several liability "against and among all defendants which
bear less than twenty-five percent of the negligence attributable to all defendants" in med-
ical professional liability actions) (Section 29-12A-7(d) similarly modifies joint and several
liability in actions against a political subdivision or its employees.).
Joint and several liability reform measures were introduced in at least twenty-seven
states during the 1986 legislative session. See Liability Alert, Capitol Impact Publications,
Vol. I, No. 1 (Feb. 28, 1986). Other states are considering joint and several liability re-
forms which still may be enacted in 1987. For example, one bi-monthly publication which
tracks state tort reform efforts has identified at least twenty jurisdictions in which bills to
abolish or modify joint and several liability have been introduced. See Liability Alert, Capi-
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tains to non-economic damages.3 0 And already in 1987, at least ten
states have enacted legislation reforming joint and several liability.
3 1
tol Impact Publications, Vol. I, Nos. 22-24, Vol. II, Nos. 1-9 (Jan. 15-June 30, 1987). Ari-
zona, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee and Texas have all had legislation introduced which would abolish joint and
several liability. See also infra note 31 in which it is noted that in at least ten of these states,
legislation has been signed into law during 1987.
30. California Proposition 51, entitled the "Fair Responsibility Act of 1986," was ap-
proved with a sixty-two percent majority in the June 3, 1986 primary and became effective
immediately. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431.1-.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1987).
31. North Dakota enacted outright abrogation. Nine others enacted substantial modi-
fications. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1987) ("[w]hen two or more parties are
found to have contributed to the injury, the liability of each party is several only, and is not
joint, and each party is liable only for the amount of damages attributable to the percent-
age of fault of that party" except in cases involving concerted action); Act of Feb. 12, 1987,
ch. 1, § 2, 1987 ARIZ. LEGIS. SERV. I (West) (to be codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-
2506) ("[Tjhe liability of each defendant for damages is several only and is not joint"
except in cases involving concerted action, hazardous wastes, or where "a person was act-
ing as an agent or servant of the party."); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-33 (Cum. Supp. 1987)
("Where .. .the plaintiff is himself to some degree responsible for the injury or damages
claimed, the trier of fact ... may apportion its award of damages among the persons who
are liable and whose degree of fault is greater than that of the injured party.... Damages
: ..shall be the liability of each person against whom they are awarded [and] shall not be a
joint liability."); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3)-(7) (Cum. Supp. 1987) ("The common law doc-
trine ofjoint and several liability is hereby limited to causes of action .. .where [persons]
were acting in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of another
party... relating to hazardous or toxic waste or substances or solid waste disposal sites ...
[or] arising from the manufacture of any medical devices or pharmaceutical products.");
Act of Apr. 14, 1987, § B, 1987 Mo. LEGIS. SERV. 49 (to be codified at Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 509.050.41) (Joint and several liability is retained except where plaintiff is contributorily
negligent. If any defendant's equitable share is determined to be "uncollectible," it is
reallocated to the remaining parties; but "[n]o amount shall be reallocated to any party
whose assessed percentage of fault is less than the plaintiff's so as to increase that party's
liability by more than a factor of two."); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-703(2)-(3) (1987) ("Any
party whose negligence is determined to be 50% or less of the combined negligence of all
persons . . .is severally liable only and is responsible only for the amount of negligence
attributable to him, except . . . if [they] acted in concert . . .or if one party acted as an
agent of the other."); Nevada S. 511 (to be codified at NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 41.141(4)-(5))
(signed by governorJune 22, 1987) ("a defendant whose negligence is less that that of the
plaintiff or his decedent is not jointly liable and except [for cases involving strict liability,
intentional torts, toxic or hazardous substances, concerted action, and product liability]
each defendant is severally liable to the plaintiff only for that portion of the judgment
which represents the percentage of negligence attributable to him"); Act of Apr. 7, 1987,
ch. 141, § 1, 1987 N.M. STAT. ANN. ADV. LEGIS. SERV. 852 (to be codified at N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 41-3-1) [hereinafter N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-3-1] ("joint and several liability upon
two or more wrongdoers whose conduct proximately caused an injury to any plaintiff is
abolished" except in cases involving intentional torts, vicarious liability, product liability,
and in "situations ... having a sound basis in public policy"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-8-15.1 (Supp. 1987) ("any party who is allocated less than fifty percent of the total
fault allocated to all parties may not be jointly liable for more than twice the percentage of
fault allocated to that party"); Act of June 16, 1987, ch. 2, § 2.09, 1987 TEX. SEss. LAWv
SERV. 81 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.013(a)-(c))
("[A] liable defendant is liable to a claimant only for the percentage of the damages found
by the trier of fact equal to that defendant's percentage of responsibility with respect to
the personal injury, property damage, death, or other harm for which the damages are
allowed ... [unless] the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater
that 20 percent; and ...[in comparative responsibility cases, where] the percentage of
responsibility attributed to the defendant is greater than the percentage of responsibility
attributed to the claimant ... [or in cases where] no percentage of responsibility is attrib-
uted to the claimant and the percentage of responsibility attributed to the defendant is
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III. THE DEVELOPING LAW AFFECTING JOINT TORTFEASORS
The doctrine of joint and several liability, holding any of several
tortfeasors responsible 32 for the acts of all, has its origin in the common
law.3 3 Originally, its application was limited to joint tortfeasors3 4 acting
in concert,35 and was subject to strict procedural limitations. Rules re-
lating to joint tortfeasors, procedural joinder, and tortfeasors acting in
concert, as well as other rules governing application of the doctrine of
joint and several liability have changed gradually over the centuries.
However, the doctrine of joint and several liability itself has not been
modified in conjunction with these developments; rather, it has re-
mained stubbornly entrenched in the common law. A brief survey and
discussion of the developing law regarding other rules applicable to
multiple tortfeasors is necessary to provide an understanding of the
problems caused by the curious stagnation of joint and several liability
and to demonstrate why reform is necessary.
A. Procedural Joinder
At common law, the concepts of procedural joinder and joint and
several liability were indistinguishable because there could be no joinder
of parties unless it was alleged that they were jointly responsible for acts
done in concert. 3 6 Because procedural joinder was limited to cases in-
volving concerted action, 3 7 the American courts began equating "join-
der" with "joint liability." With the advent, in the mid-19th century, of
greater than 10% . . . [or in cases where] claimant's . . . injury . . . resulted from a 'toxic
tort'.").
32. The term "responsible" is used here even though in American courts today "lia-
ble" or "entirely liable" may be preferable in a technical sense. But, as will be discussed
below, a central theme of this article is that any reform effort should focus on returning
"responsibility" as the primary touchstone for liability. At its inception, joint and several
liability was based on vicarious liability, which is an indirect legal responsibility for the acts
of another. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 322.
33. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46 at 323; 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 10.1 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES & GRAY].
34. The terms "joint tortfeasor" and "joint tort" have been the subject of a great deal
of confusion and have been the source of many of the problems in this area as is discussed
infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text. See Prosser, supra note I, at 413 (the terms mean
"radically different things to different courts");Jackson, supra note i, at 403 ("[joint tort']
• . . is often used in different senses by the same court"); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1,
§ 46, at 322.
35. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 322; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY,
supra note 33; 1 S. SPEISER, C. KRAUSE & A. GANS, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 3.6. at
392-93 (1983) [hereinafter SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS]. It is illustrative of the confusion that
has grown out of the law of joint torts to note that the phrase 'joint tortfeasors acting in
concert" would have been redundant at common law. Today it is a necessary distinction
as tortfeasors no longer need to "act in concert" before they are considered join
tortfeasors.
36. Prosser, supra note I, at 414-15; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at
7-8.
37. HARPER,JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 8 n.24; see also PROSSER & KEETON
citing FIELD CODE OF PROCEDURE OF NEW YORK (1948) as statute authorizing settlement of
questions connected with one transaction to be joined in a single suit.
660 (Vol. 64:4
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
codes of procedure allowing joinder,38 the American courts gradually
began to liberalize the rules. Today procedural joinder no longer re-
quires an assertion of entire liability. 39 Confusion results because the
courts have continued to equate "joinder" with "joint liability" even
though the rules for joinder have become more liberal.40 This has had
the illogical and unfortunate effect of allowing the substantive law of
joint and several liability to sometimes turn on the procedural issue of
joinder.
4 1
At common law, because courts required joint and several liability
as a prerequisite for procedural joinder, pure several liability would
have been difficult if not impossible to administer. However, under
modern codes allowing for permissive joinder, a rule of pure several
liability has become feasible and would be much easier to administer
and enforce than was the case at common law. Procedural joinder gives
the trier of fact a perspective of totality of evidence relating to all per-
sons involved in the suit, thus facilitating the allocation of responsibility
on a proportionate basis.
B. Definition of Joint Tort
Generally speaking, a joint tort can be defined as an act causing
harm for which two or more persons can be held liable.4 2 At common
law, ajoint tort required a concert of action, a common plan, or later in
time, the breach of a joint duty. 4 3 Originally, it required a true joint
enterprise so that "all coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party,
the act of one is the act of all .... ,,44 Today the definition has been
expanded to include additional categories so that, generally, a joint tort
has been found by courts in cases involving (1) concert of action;4 5 (2)
common duty;46 (3) vicarious liability;
4 7 and (4) concurrent torts.
48
38. See Harris,Joinder of Causes and Parties, 36 W. VA. L.Q 192 (1929-30) (summary of
the development ofjoint and several liability).
39. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 47, at 325-26.
40. Prosser, supra note 1, at 416-18.
41. This is one of the confused results of later courts' interpretations of tile early
common law. They doggedly equated "joinder" with "joint liability" even though there
was no indication that the common law courts intended to do so. A second area of confu-
sion, involving the definition of a joint tort, is discussed infra notes 42-52 and accompany-
ing text. These sources of confusion, and the law which grew up around them, are
important to an understanding of where the law is today with respect to joint and several
liability, and to understanding the theoretical arguments urging reform in the wake of
comparative fault, alternative liability theories, and other recent developments in the law.
42. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46, at 322-23. But Prosser points out that
the definition of a joint tort has "meant very different things to different courts, and often
to the same court .. ." Id. at 322.
43. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 2.
44. SirJohn Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613); see also PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 1, § 46, at 322-23.
45. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co. v. Polak, 7 F.2d 583, 584 (9th
Cir. 1925), cert. denied 269 U.S. 581 (1926); Bobich v. Dackow, 229 Ky. 830, 18 S.W. 2d
280, 281 (1929); Wrabek v. Suchomel, 145 Minn. 468, 177 N.W. 764, 766 (1920); Oliver
v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666, 667 (1926); Garrett v. Garrett, 228 N.C. 530, 46
S.E.2d 302 (1948); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 346.
46. Simmons v. Everson, 124 N.Y. 319, 26 N.E. 911 (1891); Klauder v. McGrath, 35
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As late as post-World War I, joint and several liability was largely
restricted to its common law origins. 49 But during the last half-century
there has been a substantial expansion ofjoint and several liability, due
in large part to the expansion of the definition of "joint tort." The law
has been expanded so that persons acting independently of each other
can be held liable as joint tortfeasors. 50 Joint and several liability also
has been expanded from intentional torts to negligence and strict liabil-
ity. 5 ' Thus, while 'joint tort" classifications have increased in number
and complexity, the central consequence flowing therefrom has re-
mained unchanged: entire liability attaches. This is true even though
there are clear distinctions in the degree of participation and culpability
as between the different types of "joint torts."
'5 2
C. Contribution
Under contribution principles, a tortfeasor against whom a judg-
ment is rendered is entitled to recover on a proportionate basis from
other joint tortfeasors who also were liable to the plaintiff for contribut-
ing to the injury. 53 While contribution actions were prohibited at com-
mon law, 54 today they are allowed in the overwhelming majority of
states.55 Abolition of the rule against contribution was a response "to
the injustice of one defendant shouldering the responsibility of
others,"' 56 particularly when he was acting independently and the harm
Pa. 128 (1860); Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639, 28 S.E. 744, 746 (1897); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 346.
47. Mayberry v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 100 Minn. 79, 110 N.W. 356 (1907); Ver-
linda v. Stone & Webster Engineering Corp., 44 Mont. 223, 119 P. 573 (1911); Allen v.
Trester, 112 Neb. 515, 199 N.W. 841, 844 (1924); Schumpert v. Southern Ry. Co., 65 S.C.
332, 43 S.E. 813 (1903); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 346.
48. Way v. Waterloo, Cedar Falls & Northern R.R., 239 Iowa 244, 29 N.W.2d 867
(1947); Arnst v. Estes, 136 Me. 272, 8 A.2d 201 (1939); Nees v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co.,
218 Minn. 532, 16 N.W.2d 758 (1944); Schools v. Walker, 187 Va. 619, 47 S.E.2d 418
(1948); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 347-48.
49. See generally Wigmore, Joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; Making the Innocent
Party Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923). In this short article, Wigmore laid
out a thoughtful and persuasive case for broadening the scope of joint liability. Other
commentators, and gradually the courts, built upon and followed this lead; this persuasive
logic has been cited by many famous and not-so-famous authors on the subject. See, e.g.,
Prosser, supra note 1, at 438 n.161; Jackson, supra note 1, at 420-21 & nn.92-93.
50. See, e.g., Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. Rowe, 543 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1976). In this
action for indemnification brought by a chemical company against other manufacturers,
the court found that contribution was the appropriate remedy. Where tortious acts of two
or more wrongdoers cannot be apportioned, wrongdoers may be held jointly and severally
liable for the entire damages and the plaintiff may choose whether to proceed against all or
one in one single suit.
51. SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS supra note 35, § 3.6.
52. See generally, Prosser, supra note I (discussion of intentional concerted action v.
independent negligence).
53. Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799); Greer v. Intercole Automa-
tion, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 375 (D. Colo. 1982); see HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33,
§ 10.2, at 39; Prosser, supra note 1, at 425-29.
55. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.7, at 273.
56. Recent Developments in Joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319, 1334
(1973) (citing rationale for New York Legislature's enactment of N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R.
1401 (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1987)).
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was unintentional. 5 7 The primary reason for allowing contribution
rather than simply abrogating joint and several liability was the desire to
compensate the innocent plaintiff.58 Clearly it was not based on the de-
gree of the defendant's moral fault.
5 9
In this sense, the right of contribution was a substitute for pure sev-
eral liability. The problem in justifying this substitute today is that the




Contributory negligence is negligent conduct by a plaintiff which is
a contributing cause to his own harm. 6 1 Historically, contributory negli-
gence was asserted as a complete defense, and if proven, barred the
plaintiff from recovery. 6 2 When recovery was barred due to contribu-
tory negligence, the right of contribution was theoretically a more justi-
fiable alternative to eliminating joint and several liability than is the case
today. This is true because the original justification for allowing contri-
bution as an alternative to pure several liability was that as between two
parties, the one most responsible ought to shoulder the burden for
harm caused by a judgment-proof third party.
6 3
As the law has continued to evolve, however, in a majority of states
the concept of contributory negligence as a defense barring recovery has
been replaced with the concept of comparative fault. 6 4 However, com-
parative fault, because it does not prohibit recovery does not necessarily
mean that the plaintiff is totally innocent. Indeed, often he may be more
at fault than the defendant against whom he is collecting damages.
6 5
Thus, the rationale behind the original justification disappears, and it
57. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875) (contribution action permis-
sible); see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 426-27.
58. See, e.g., Wigmore,joint-Tortfeasors and Severance of Damages; 11aking the Innocent Party
Suffer Without Redress, 17 ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923).
59. "Moral fault on the part of the defendant" as a justification for imposing joint and
several liability is discussed infra note 103 and accompanying text.
60. The plaintiff lacks innocence in the sense that, like culpable defendants, his con-
duct is below the standard to which he is legally required to conform for his own protec-
tion. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(comparative negligence approved); see also discussion of contributory negligence infra
notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
61. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 809, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 862 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977).
62. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 65, at 451-52.
63. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.2, at 44-45.
64. See discussion of comparative fault, infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text; see
also Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465 (1963).
65. See, e.g., Ambriz v. Kress, 148 Cal. App. 3d 963, 196 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1983). In
Ambriz, plaintiff was found to be twenty percent negligent, defendant Kress was found to
be seventy percent negligent and defendant McDowell was found to be ten percent negli-
gent. For all practical purposes Kress was judgment-proof, leaving McDowell liable for
the entire amount of defendants' liability under the doctrine ofjoint and several liability.
The result was that defendant McDowell could have ended lip paving ali award in excess of
S300,000 to a plaintif who was found to be twice as much at fault. The court relieved the ineq-
uity by granting defendant McDowell's motion for contribution against Ambriz.
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logically follows that the liability of defendants less responsible than the
plaintiff for the total harm caused ought to be several. This much is
required to effect the policy considerations preferring contribution as an
alternative to the abrogation of joint and several liability.6 6 Whether
application of pure several liability is feasible as a practical matter is an-
other question, to be addressed later in this article.
67
E. Comparative Fault
The concept of comparative fault provides a basis for reducing
damages awarded to a plaintiff in proportion to the determined percent-
age of his fault.6 8 Perhaps the most significant development in the area
of multiple torts is the almost universal acceptance of comparative
fault. 69 Today, at least forty-four states have adopted comparative fault
as an alternative to contributory negligence. 70 Comparative fault stat-
utes already have played a key role in abolishing or substantially limiting
joint and several liability in some states. 7 1 But in most states in which
the question has been decided, the courts generally have retained joint
and several liability absent specific statutory language to the contrary. 72
Aside from the policy justifications for imposing joint and several
liability, 7 3 a powerful and often-cited practical argument in favor of the
rule has been the inability to apportion damages among joint
66. See supra text accompanying note 58.
67. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. One alternative in dealing with this
problem is to retain joint and several liability where the plaintiff is completely innocent,
but apply pure several liability when the plaintiff is contributorily negligent. At least one
state, Oklahoma, has adopted this approach (discussed in V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27,
§ 16.4, at 259). Anderson v. O'Donoghue, 677 P.2d 648 (Okla. 1983) (joint and several
liability imposed when plaintiff found not negligent); Laubach v. Morgan, 588 P.2d 1071
(Okla. 1978) (liability apportioned where plaintiff was found contributorily negligent).
Another approach is to retain joint and several liability as to individual defendants whose
percentage of fault is greater than that of the plaintiff, even though plaintiff was partially at
fault, but to apply pure several liability to those defendants whose percentage of fault is
less than that of plaintiff's. Oregon uses this approach. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.485 (1985).
Either of these options would work to avoid the inequitable result described in supra note
65.
68. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 471-72.
69. There are two types of comparative negligence statutes that predominate: (1)
pure comparative negligence statutes, which allow a plaintiff to recover damages regard-
less of his degree of fault; and (2) mixed comparative negligence statutes, which preclude a
plaintiff from recovering damages when his negligence exceeds a statutorily specified per-
centage in comparison to the defendants. For a summary of these types of comparative
negligence statutes, see Mountain Mobile Mix, Inc. v. Gifford, 660 P.2d 883 (Colo. 1983).
The term "comparative fault" is used interchangeably with "comparative negligence,"
but the authors prefer the term comparative negligence when discussing cases that do not
involve traditional fault-based liability.
70. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 1.1, at 3. The six states that have not adopted
comparative fault, either through legislation or judicial decisions, are Alabama, Maryland,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
71. See supra notes 27-28.
72. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.4, at 258-61.
73. See Note, Adjusting Losses Among Joint Tortfeasors in Iehicular Collision Cases, 68 YALE
L.J. 964, 964-67 (1959) ("moral" fault cannot be practically determined, and apportioning
recovery based on moral fault would impair the benefits of distributing the risk to the
widest possible segment of society).
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tortfeasors. 74 But the adoption of comparative fault negates any proce-
dural relevance this argument may have had in the past. In addition, the
acceptance of common sense approximations in apportionment of dam-
ages7 5 addresses the argument as it relates to practical problems in de-
termining exact percentages in apportionment. 76 Therefore, the advent
of comparative fault has seriously undermined one of the most powerful
theoretical underpinnings of joint and several liability.
F. Jury Apportionment of Damages
At common law, juries were prohibited from apportioning damages
among the parties. 77 As a practical matter, this rule made it impossible
to impose anything less than entire liability. Thus, at common law there
was no basis for pure several liability. Today, through modern compara-
tive negligence statutes, juries not only are allowed but usually directed
to apportion fault. 78 But the ability to apportion fault has yet to lead to
its logical conclusion of equating responsibility7 9 with liability. Instead,
application of responsibility principles has been limited primarily to
contribution actions and comparative fault.
74. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 67, at 470; Jackson, supra note 1, at
408; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 5; SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra
note 35, § 3.7.
75. It never has been required and indeed is impossible to reduce damage apportion-
ments to exact percentages. It has been left to the trier of fact to estimate approximate
percentages based on all the evidence presented. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 402 n.9
("[T]he approved practice is to leave [the computation of damages] to the good sense of
the jury, as reasonable men, to form from the evidence the best estimate that can be made
under the circumstances.") (quoting Mark v. Hudson R. Bridge Co., 103 N.Y. 28, 8 N.E.
243 (1886)); Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 135 ("juries should not be held to
great ... accuracy ofjudgment in ascertaining the damages to be assessed against each of
the tortfeasors and the court should be slow to interfere with such verdicts") (quoting
Swain v. Tennessee Copper Co., 78 S.W. 93 (Tenn. 1903)); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
1, § 52, at 345 (apportionment will be made "[wlhere a factual basis can be found for some
rough practical apportionment").
76. Exact apportionment of damages can never be achieved in an absolute sense.
This determination is necessarily dependent upon the trier of fact's subjective determina-
tions as to legal cause and cause in fact. See discussion of causation infra notes 129-50 and
accompanying text.
77. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 46 at 323 n.5 and accompanying text; Pros-
ser, supra note 1, at 414; Recent Developments in joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1319, 1333 (1973); 46 A.L.R.3D 830 (1972); 74 AM.JUR.2D Torts § 76, at 684 (1974). It is
interesting to note that notwithstanding the courts' instructions to the contrary, many ju-
ries made ingenious attempts to circumvent the harsh result ofjoint and several liability.
However, these efforts to deliver an equitable damage apportionment were met with
rather hostile treatment by the courts. See, e.g., Detroit City Gas Co. v. Syme, 109 F.2d
366, 369 (6th Cir. 1940) (jury returned two separate verdicts, forcing court to order new
trial); Dauenhauer v. Sullivan, 215 Cal. App. 2d 231, 30 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1963) (court disre-
garded jury apportionment of $37,000 judgment among four defendants and held the de-
fendants jointly and severally liable for the entire damage award); Weddle v. Loges, 52
Cal. App. 2d 115, 125 P.2d 914 (1942) (The jury returned a single $5,000 judgment for
plaintiff, apportioning damages between two defendants at $4,250 and $750, respectively.
The court disregarded the jury's apportionment and held defendants jointly and severally
liable for the full $5,000).
78. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 2.3, at 41.
79. "Responsibility" is used here in lieu of "fault" or "negligence" to avoid semantic
problems in cases of strict liability. See supra note 32.
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G. Alternative Liability
Where one of several alternative parties is responsible for the harm
caused, but it is difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to prove which
party caused the harm, courts will shift the burden of proof as to who
caused the harm from the plaintiff to the defendants. 80 However, if de-
fendants are identifiable, some factual basis for a rough apportionment
of responsibility exists. Even in those cases where there is insufficient
evidence to make a studied comparison of relative degrees of responsi-
bility, juries can, and often do, resort to an equal or approximate divi-
sion of damages. 8 1 The real problem exists where it is impossible for
the plaintiff to identify which of several wrongdoers caused or contrib-
uted to the harm in question. To address this problem, courts have de-
veloped theories of alternative liability,8 2 which subsequently have been
incorporated into the Restatement.
8 3
However, it must be remembered that the central issue in these
cases is really one of causation rather than apportionment. It is impor-
tant that this distinction remains clear. If the inquiry is "which of these
negligent actors caused harm," and it is impossible for the plaintiff to
prove who caused the harm, then a theory of alternative liability can
shift to the defendants the burden of proof as to causation. If the de-
fendants cannot meet that burden, they should be held severally liable
for the harm caused. However, where the inquiry is "how responsible is
each contributing wrongdoer for the harm caused," it should remain for
the trier of fact to make the best estimate as to the proper apportion-
ment of responsibility.
80. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B and Comments (1977) (citing Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)); Cummings v. Kendall, 41 Cal. App. 2d 549, 107
P.2d 282 (1940).
81. See, e.g., HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 10.2; see also sources cited supra
note 75.
82. See, e.g., Borel v. Fireboard Paper Prods., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (worker
exposed to asbestos manufactured by at least eleven different companies was unable to
ascertain which manufacturer's product actually caused asbestosis); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25
Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (patient having appendix removed awoke with injured
shoulder - impossible to identify which of numerous hospital personnel caused the in-
jury); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (third hunter struck when two
companions simultaneously fired guns in his direction - impossible to identify which
companion fired the shot that accidentally hit plaintiff).
83. (1) Except as stated in Subsections (2) and (3), the burden of proof that the
tortious conduct of the defendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the
plaintiff.
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liabil-
ity on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the
burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each such actor.
(3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is proved that
harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them, but there is uncertainty
as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon each such actor to prove that he
has not caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (1977).
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H. Burdens of Proof
One issue to be resolved in a pure several liability reform measure
is the allocation of the burden of proof for correct apportionment of
damages. Early cases on the issue placed the burden on the plaintiff,
8 4
but the modern approach has been to place it on the defendants. 8 5 The
burden requirement evidently came about as a result of confusion be-
tween the 'fact of damage," which has to do with causation, and the
"amount of damages," which involves apportionment.
In arguing against the practice of placing the burden of apportion-
ment on the plaintiff, one distinguished writer concluded that a plaintiff
"should not be denied any recovery simply because the amount of dam-
ages, as distinguished from the fact of damage, is impossible of exact
ascertainment."' 86 This argument is wholly logical and well grounded in
fairness and equity. But it does not logically follow that the burden
should be placed on the defendants in these cases. To do so would
mean that failure to prove an exact apportionment formula, which is
often inevitable, would lead to entire liability. It is neither fair nor nec-
essary to require a defendant to prove he was only one percent responsi-
ble for the harm caused and, if he fails, to hold him one hundred percent
liable.
There is no need to impose a requirement that any particular party
bear the burden with respect to apportionment. At least one of the
recent joint and several liability reform bills provides some support for
this position. 8 7 This legislation provides that all parties should have the
opportunity to present evidence to the trier of fact, and the trier of fact
should determine apportionment without requiring that either party
prove which apportionment formula should be used.
88
Generally, the burden of proof as to causation should be on the
plaintiff, as is the case today. For those problem areas where that bur-
den is impossible to meet, the theories of alternative liability usually suf-
fice to prevent injustice to the innocent plaintiff. However, to require
any party to prove the "correct" apportionment is unfair and, in many
cases, impossible.
There are sufficient incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants to
84. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 1, at 400-0 1; Recent Developments, supra note 1, at
134; Wigmore, supra note 58.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1977); SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS,
supra note 35, § 3.7; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33; Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1208 (8th Cir. 1982); Borel, 493 F.2d at 1095.
86. Jackson, supra note 1, at 402 (emphasis added).
87. "[This bill] does not specify who has the burden of proof as to apportionment of
non-economic loss. Based on the evidence presented, the trier of fact should apportion
responsibility among all parties. All the parties will have an opportunity to present their
case to the trier of fact as to the appropriate apportionment of responsibility, so that liabil-
ity can be assigned based on that apportionment. The trier of fact shall make a determina-
tion as to apportionment without a requirement that any particular party 'prove' which
apportionment formula should be applied." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 69-70 (1986) (majority views).
88. Id.
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argue vigorously their respective perceptions as to the degree of respon-
sibility attributable to each wrongdoer. All parties should come to
court, make their case, and leave to the trier of fact the task of extrapo-
lating from the evidence a logical, common sense apportionment. The
imposition of burdens confuses the issue and makes impossible any
chance of reform.
I. Release
A release is the "abandonment of a claim to the party against whom
it exists .... ,,89 However, it does not necessarily mean that in giving a
release the plaintiff has received full satisfaction of a claim.90 At com-
mon law, the release of one of several tortfeasors released all. 9 1 But for
independent multiple tortfeasors this is no longer the law. 9 2 If full satis-
faction is not received, claims against defendants other than the ones
released are not discharged. 9 3 When a release is conditioned on settle-
ment, an offsetting credit is usually allowed to diminish the amount of
damages recoverable against the remaining defendants. 94 Such a rule is
justified as an encouragement for the plaintiff to settle. 9 5
However justified, the development of this rule is a clear example of
the dual standards that exist in the law of multiple tortfeasors. For pur-
poses of release, mere concurrent torts, which are concurrent wrongful
acts or omissions of two or more persons acting independently, 96 are
correctly considered independent and separate claims. Release of one
concurrent tortfeasor does not release all. 9 7 But in cases involving con-
certed action, the acts of several joint tortfeasors give rise to but one
cause of action,9 8 and release of a single joint tortfeasor releases all.9 9
A clear distinction is drawn here between concerted actions and in-
dependent but concurrent torts, with great emphasis placed on the inde-
pendence of each cause of action against concurrent tortfeasors.10 0
For purposes of invoking ultimate liability, however, the distinction
disappears and tortfeasors are treated as one, regardless of whether they
act independently or in concert.' 0 ' The distinction recognized between
different types of multiple torts for purposes of release should be car-
ried over to the doctrines of liability.
89. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33.
90. Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 423.
91. Prosser, supra note 1, at 423.
92. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 49, at 333-34.
93. Id. at 335.
94. Id.; see also Schmelzer v. Farrar, 48 Ohio App. 2d 210, 356 N.E.2d 751 (1976).
95. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 49, at 333.
96. Concurrent torts are discussed infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
97. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33.
98. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 49, at 432.
99. Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 422-23.
100. Prosser, supra note 1, at 245.
101. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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IV. DOCTRINAL JUSTIFICATIONS
In tracing the policy development of the doctrine, it is interesting to
note the changes in justifications for imposing joint and several liability
as the doctrine has continued to expand in scope. There are four funda-
mental and sometimes conflicting policy justifications for joint and sev-
eral liability: (1) moral fault; (2) compensating the innocent plaintiff; (3)
loss distribution; and (4) ability to pay.
10 2
A. Moral Fault
The need to punish moral fault or culpability was considered ade-
quate justification for the common law cases involving concerted ac-
tion. 0 3 As the doctrine of joint and several liability was expanded to
apply to non-intentional, independent torts, moral fault alone obviously
would not justify the imposition of joint and several liability.
B. Compensating the Innocent Plaintiff
When moral fault proved to be an insufficient justification, the pol-
icy considerations began to focus on the need to compensate the inno-
cent victim. 10 4 In the wake of comparative negligence, as discussed
earlier in this article, compensation of innocent victims should not jus-




Loss distribution is another justification for joint and several liabil-
ity. It favors distributing the loss throughout society by way of insurance
companies, large self-insurers, or some type of social insurance pro-
gram. 10 6 Perhaps the biggest problem with this policy is that it works
too well. The resulting increase in insurance rates and product costs is a
painful illustration of its success. 10 7 In addition, local governments at-
tribute recent tax increases and service cutbacks directly to their deep-
pocket exposures. 1
0 8
D. Ability to Pay
More recently, greater emphasis has been placed on shifting the
loss to the party best able to pay' 0 9 - the deep pocket. Ultimately,
102. See Note, supra note 73; Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 141.
103. See Note, supra note 73, at 964 n.i.
104. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
106. See Note, supra note 73, at 966-67; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 33, § 13.
107. See sources cited infra note 110.
108. See, e.g., 1985 Insurance Hearings, supra note 11, at 155-57; Report on Municipality
Liability, supra note 12, at 731-36.
109. Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 141 (citing authority which recognizes that,
in addition to the traditional justifications such as responsibility for harm, it is appropriate
for courts to consider who is best able to bear the loss in determining liability of the
parties).
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however, the deep-pocket defendant has the ability to pass the cost on to
society as a whole. Higher prices, increased taxes and reduced services
are examples of how this cost is passed through to society. Thus, in
these cases, the ultimate burden does not fall on the defendant who is
best able to bear the loss. More accurately stated, the initial burden falls
on the defendant who is best able to distribute the loss among those who
ultimately bear the burden - consumers and taxpayers. 1 10
In this sense, the civil justice system is being used as a national so-
cial insurance program. If that is the desired result, it could be adminis-
tered much more efficiently through means other than the legal system.
The policy of equating liability with responsibility would avoid the unfair
result of imposing the ultimate burden on those who are completely in-
nocent and wholly unassociated with the case.
Before turning to specific reform proposals, it is necessary to put
some remaining problematic issues into perspective.
V. CONCURRENT TORTS
A concurrent tort occurs when the harm is proximately caused by
the concurrent wrongful acts or omissions of two or more persons act-
ing independently.1 l' It is important to understand that the classifica-
tion of "concurrent torts" is a broad heading which can be subdivided
into many different categories. Clear theoretical distinctions can be
made between these categories and the circumstances which accompany
them. As to the defendants' position, there are three general categories
worthy of note.
First, the defendants' acts individually may not be sufficient to cause
any harm by themselves, but combine to result in actionable harm to the
plaintiff." 1 2 Second, each defendant's act alone would cause some of the
harm, but all acts combine to result in the total harm." l3 Third, each
defendant's act is sufficient in itself to cause the entire harm, but com-
bines with some redundant force which, although a legal cause of the
harm, is unnecessary in bringing about the result."
14
It is also important to consider the position of the plaintiff when
concurrent torts are involved.' 15 First, the plaintiff may be completely
110. See Report on Municipal Liability, supra note 12, at 35-36; see also SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP.
No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-71 (1986) ("Unlike private companies, local govern-
ments do not always have the flexibility of withdrawing a service because it entails high
risks.... Payment has been guaranteed because in most cases, cities are required by law
to pay their liability obligations and are able to spread the liability among many people in
the form of taxes or other levies. In this way municipalities act as ad hoc insurance compa-
nies providing compensation to the injured."); see generally Small Business Insurance Hearings,
supra note 11, at 614 (discussion of the disproportionate cost of insurance).
111. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 405 n.24.
112. Id. at 407.
113. Id. at 415.
114. Id. at 413.
115. The effect of plaintiffs' responsibility vis-a-vis defendants generally has not been
considered by commentators in discussing the type of liability that should attach to multi-
ple tortfeasors. It has been said that the plaintiffs' conduct is not "tortious" and therefore
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innocent, harmed by the acts of the defendants through no fault of his
own. Second, the plaintiff may come to the case bearing some compara-
tive responsibility for causing the harm. Finally, there may be multiple
plaintiffs, with some of them sharing in the responsibility for causing the
harm, and some of them completely innocent.
Theoretically, there are strong justifications for treating these dis-
tinct classifications differently for purposes ofjoint and several liability.
For example, the strongest case for imposing joint and several liability
might involve a defendant whose act alone is sufficient to cause the en-
tire harm and a plaintiff who is wholly innocent. The strongest case for
pure several liability might involve a defendant whose conduct alone is
not sufficient to cause the entire harm and a plaintiff who is contribu-
torily negligent.
However, these distinct classifications often disappear in practical
application because the trier of fact can eliminate them arbitrarily
through subjective causation determinations. 116 When contributory
negligence was the majority rule, this was often the case. Juries tended
to ignore what appeared to be partial negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in order to avoid the harsh result of barring any recovery.' 17
To further complicate the matter, there are many situations involv-
ing harm for which non-parties are responsible, where it is impossible to
bring those parties into the case. Examples include cases involving im-
munity, 1 18 lack of jurisdiction,'' 9 and acts of God. 120 Because of the
problems in formulating criteria to distinguish between these theoretical
categories, and because of the endless number of circumstances in
which they can arise, the authors urge that a single rule should be for-
mulated for all multiple tortfeasors acting independently of each other.
VI. FALSE LABELS AND CONFUSED APPLICATIONS
The general rule of joint and several liability is that "[e]ach of two
or more persons whose tortious conduct is a legal cause of a single and
indivisible harm to the injured party is subject to liability to the injured
party for the entire harm."' 12 1 Applying this principle, all concurrent
tortfeasors discussed in the preceding section are jointly and severally
should not affect the joint liability of the tortfeasors. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 589-90, 578 P.2d 899, 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 189
(1978).
116. For a discussion of causation see infra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
117. An example of this is the famous case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d
1 (1948). In Sunmers, the plaintiff, who was in the same hunting party as the two defend-
ants, acted outside accepted hunting norms when he forged ahead of his two companions
rather than staying abreast of them. Yet this fact was conveniently ignored by the trier of
fact.
118. See, e.g., Beck v. Wessel, 90 S.D. 107, 237 N.W.2d 905 (1976).
119. See, e.g., Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919); Sauver v. New Mexico Peterbilt.
Inc., 101 N.M. 84, 678 P.2d 712 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
120. See, e.g., Long v. Crystal Refrigerator Co., 134 Neb. 44, 277 N.W. 830 (1938) (se-
vere windstorm asserted as an act of God).
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977) (emphasis added).
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liable for the entire harm caused. This should not be the result. Thus,
the problematic aspects of the general rule stated above are highlighted
and discussed in the following paragraphs and then some recommenda-
tions for changes are proposed.
A. Tortious Conduct
The argument advanced for retaining the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability in the wake of comparative negligence is that application of
the doctrine is limited to defendants. 122 It has been said that the plain-
tiff's conduct only creates a risk of self-injury, and therefore cannot be
tortious. 1 23 Since tortious conduct is a requirement for imposition of
joint and several liability, the doctrine is limited to defendants.
124
Joint liability, however, should not turn on whether conduct techni-
cally is considered "tortious." A plaintiff's acts may not be "tortious" in
the sense that no legal duty exists to exercise due care for one's own
safety. However, failure to exercise that care most certainly harms
others in that it can result in others ultimately becoming exposed to un-
limited liability for the consequences of a plaintiff's negligence.
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,125 a landmark case
that limited the imposition of joint and several liability to defendants
because of the tortious conduct requirement, somewhat inconsistently
based liability on the principle that "a tortfeasor is liable for any injury
of which his negligence is a proximate cause. Liability attaches . .. not
because he is responsible for the acts of other[s] . .. but because he is
responsible for all damage of which his own negligence was a proximate
cause."' 2 6 However, the plaintiff's "proximate cause" is conveniently
ignored. The plaintiff is treated differently because his conduct is not
considered "tortious." And this is so even though the plaintiff's actions
clearly harmed the remaining parties by increasing, indeed often creating,
their liability exposure. Without the artificial distinction between "tor-
122. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
123. Id. at 589-90, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
124. Id.
125. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). The plaintiff sought
damages from motorcycle organizations which sponsored a cross-country race in which he
was seriously injured. He claimed that the defendants had negligently designed, managed,
supervised, and administered the race. The defenses raised included a claim that the in-
jured party's own negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries, and that the injured
party's parents were negligent in failing to exercise their power of supervision over their
minor child. Defendants argued that their liability should be limited to the percentage of
damages allocated to them under the recently adopted rule of comparative negligence. In
essence, defendants argued that California's comparative negligence rule abrogated the
rule of joint and several liability.
126. Id. at 587, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187; see also 86 C.J.S. Torts § 35, at
951-52 (1955). Note the different bases for imposing joint and several liability on concur-
rent tortfeasors. At common law, joint and several liability was based on vicarious liability
because it was limited to true "joint torts." See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
More recently in concurrent torts, vicarious liability is specifically rejected as a basis,
and is replaced by the proximate cause basis discussed in the text accompanying this note.
Cf. discussion of doctrinal justifications, supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
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tious" and "negligent," combined with the American Motorcycle Association
court's refusal to apply the proximate cause test to the plaintiff, this in-
consistency cannot be reconciled. Further, it hardly can be considered
fair to the defendants.
The artificial, theoretical distinction between "tortious" and "negli-
gent" conduct, as applied to joint and several liability, is perhaps the
strongest illustration of the inadequacy of the joint and several liability
doctrine in the face of comparative fault. 12 7 Plaintiffs and defendants,
who can be equally at fault, are treated differently in sharing the respon-
sibility of third parties. If joint and several liability is to be retained, the
authors maintain that it should be applied to all persons whose negligent,
as opposed to tortious, conduct is the legal cause of the harm. 128 The
obvious problem with such an approach is that it would lead to the same
type of inequitable results as did the contributory negligence rule where
a partially negligent plaintiff was barred from any recovery.
B. Causation
In addition to tortious conduct, a second prerequisite to the imposi-
tion of joint and several liability is a showing of proximate or legal
cause. 129 Proximate cause is a limitation imposed by the courts requir-
ing that a sufficient causal connection - between the actor's conduct
and the harm caused - be proved as a prerequisite to the imposition of
liability.130 It serves to exculpate one whose act, although a cause in fact
of the harm, is extremely remote or has resulted in unforeseeable conse-
quences.' 3 1 However, the problem of determining whether the proxi-
mate cause requirement has been met has created a great deal of
confusion and disagreement in the law.13 2
To further complicate matters, "proximate" or "legal" cause seems
to be more broadly defined in the law of joint tortfeasors, 33 which ex-
acerbates the problem of determining whether the proximate cause re-
quirement has been met in cases involving multiple tortfeasors. First, in
the context of multiple tortfeasors, it is not clear whether the proximate
cause test is to be applied to the act of each tortfeasor, 13 4 or to an event
127. It has been pointed out that "where one of the injurers is also the victim [as in]
contributory negligence.., it is analytically the same as the joint tortfeasor case." Landes
& Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 518
(1980).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381 (N.Y. 1822); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 875 (1977); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 47; 74 AM.JUR.2D Torts § 62
(1974); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 102 (1955).
130. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41.
131. Id. at § 43; see also North v. Johnson, 58 Minn. 242, 59 N.W. 1012 (1894).
132. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 41.
133. Conduct that otherwise would be considered innocent becomes a legal cause and
therefore tortious when several parties are involved. See cases cited supra note 7; see also
infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
134. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 875 (1977) (liability is joint and several
when each person's conduct is a legal cause).
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toward which each tortfeasor's act contributes. 135 It appears that either
will suffice.
Generally, an act is tortious only when a harm is proximately caused
by the breach of an existing duty,13 6 except that in strict liability cases it
is not necessary that a duty be breached. 13 7 In cases involving joint
torts, the elements of harm or proximate cause, or both, often would be
absent if a single tortfeasor's actions were isolated. For example, con-
duct which alone would be considered innocent has been found to be
tortious when the proximate cause test is applied by combining such
conduct with the conduct of other parties to determine ultimately that
the combined event caused the harm.'
3 8
The authors do not suggest that a tortfeasor whose act, by itself, is
not sufficient to cause the harm should escape all liability under such
circumstances. But it is urged that an independent tortfeasor's liability
should be limited to what the trier of fact considers to be his share of
responsibility for causing the ultimate harm. It is unreasonable to hold
any one of a number of independent tortfeasors completely responsible
for the acts of the others because his act is a cause of the harm, as is the
case in jurisdictions continuing to follow the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability. The authors suggest that complete liability should be in-
voked only for those damages for which a tortfeasor's act is the cause of
the harm. 139 If one were to follow the logic of the American Motorcycle
Association court, making "proximate cause" the touchstone for joint and
several liability, there would be no recovery for the plaintiff where his
act constitutes a proximate cause because he too would be subject to
joint and several liability. As was ably pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, the majority's proximate cause argument "proves too
135. See 74 AM.JUR.2D Torts § 62 (1974) (joint and several liability applicable when "two
or more persons [acts] are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause"); 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 102 (1955) (joint and several liability applicable when "the concurrent negli-
gence of two or more persons combined results in an injury").
136. See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, Cases and Materials on Torts, at 144 (7th
ed. 1982).
137. Id. at 705.
138. See, e.g., Sills v. City of Los Angeles, No. C-333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 1985) (the failure of the city to trim the hedges would not have been considered tor-
tious had the driver high on drugs been alert enough to stop for the sign, as other drivers
apparently were able to do); Duggan v. City of San Diego, No. 484152 (San Diego Super.
Ct. Mar. 1, 1984) (the road curve design would not have been considered tortious had the
drunk driver not been over the center line); Laurenti v. Tiffenbach, No. A-6247-82 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984) (the act of stretching the material too tight would not
have been considered tortious had the automobile driver not turned in front of the motor-
cycle, or had the driver of the motorcycle been able to stop); Cini v. Vaughn, No. A893-
81TI (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 4, 1983) (the act of parking the tow truck on the
shoulder of the road would not have been considered tortious had the driver of the auto-
mobile not fallen asleep and veered off the expressway).
139. As Justice Clark pointed out in his dissenting opinion in American Motorcycle
Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 611, 578 P.2d 899, 920, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 203
(1978) (Clark, J., dissenting), to say otherwise "proves too much." If joint and several
liability were to attach anytime one's act constituted a cause of the harm, contributorily
negligent plaintiffs theoretically should be denied any recovery (notwithstanding the artifi-
cial distinction between "tortious" and "negligent" conduct discussed supra notes 122-28
and accompanying text).
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much."14 0 And the artificial distinction between "tortious" and "negli-
gent" conduct does not undermine the logic of the proximate cause
analysis. 141
The second major problem with causation in the area ofjoint torts
is its inherent subjectivity. 14 2 Findings of proximate cause sometime
seem to be more the result of the jury's desire to compensate the plain-
tiff than a dispassionate assessment of the wrongdoer's actual responsi-
bility. These result-oriented determinations are most obvious in cases
where the true wrongdoer is judgment-proof. 14 3
Causation determinations often involve a mixture of fact and pol-
icy. 14 4 Even in determining cause in fact, as opposed to legal cause, a
great deal of discretion is left to the trier of fact in judgment, evaluation,
interpretation, and policy considerations.1 4 5 For policymakers, the sub-
jectivity problem raises an issue of equity; for insurers and insurance
consumers it raises an issue of uncertainty.
It seems contrary to our sense of retributive justice to allow the neg-
ligent, drunk, and drugged drivers and other wrongdoers to go virtually
scot-free.' 4 6 Yet it is also unfair to require the victim, wholly innocent
or only partially at fault, to go entirely uncompensated. Confined to the
parameters of tort law, the policymaker is faced with a Hobson's choice
in attempting to resolve the dilemma of compensating an innocent
plaintiff when the wrongdoer is truly judgment-proof. However, the
'judgment-proof" wrongdoer under today's legal system is not neces-
sarily unable to pay, 1 4 7 and the policymaker's imprisonment within the
140. Id.
14 1. For discussion of tortious conduct see supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text;
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 127.
142. See generally Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956) (deter-
mination of cause in fact is influenced by policy evaluation as well as factual
considerations).
143. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7.
144. See Malone, supra note 142.
145. Id.
146. It seems inherently unjust and inequitable to require someone who reupholstered
a motorcycle seat to be liable for a $3.4 million claim because a car turned in front of a
motorcycle that could not stop soon enough to avoid the collision. See Laurenti v. Tif-
fenbach, No. A-6247-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 2, 1984). It is also unfair to require
taxpayers to absorb a $1.6 million settlement because a drunk driver went over the center
line when he was unable to negotiate a curve. Duggan v. City of San Diego, No. 484152
(San Diego Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 1984). Likewise it is unfair to require taxpayers to pay $2.16
million because a driver high on drugs ran a stop sign. Sills v. City of Los Angeles, No. C-
333504 (San Fernando Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1985).
147. In pointing out how the majority's opinion in American Alotorcycle Ass'n frustrated
the doctrine of comparative responsibility, Justice Clark's dissent indirectly alludes to
three instances in which a person might be considered judgment-proof: he may be un-
available; he may be insolvent; or he may have settled. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 611, 578 P.2d 899,
920, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 203 (1978). (Clark, J., dissenting). In each of these situations
policy-makers could find ways to reduce drastically the number of "judgment-proof" per-
sons if there was sufficient impetus to do so. Briefly those instances considered are:
Responsible actor unavailable. The actor may be unavailable in a number of ways. For
example, (1) he could be outside the reach of the court's jurisdiction; (2) he could be able
to escape service of process; (3) he may be unidentifiable; (4) the plaintiff may be unable to
locate him; (5) he may have died; (6) he may be immune; or (7) the act may have been an
act of God. (These are examples of the empty chair problems discussed in/ra notes 165-67
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confines of tort law is self-imposed. 14 8
The remaining issue raised by the problem of subjectivity in causa-
tion determinations is one of uncertainty. There are virtually no guide-
lines by which a particular defendant or potential defendant can
estimate with any degree of certainty what his liability will be in any
given case. Identical facts can mean very different things to different
juries. One jury may consider a particular person's role to be too insig-
nificant to impose liability, whereas anotherjury may find partial respon-
sibility sufficient to hold that person liable for the entire amount of
damages awarded. This all or nothing game makes risk assessment vir-
tually impossible, 14 9 leading to higher insurance costs and decreased
availability of coverage at any cost. 150 Because of the inherent problems
of subjectivity in causation determinations, the only reform option
which the authors believe could return a degree of certainty or predict-
ability to individual risk assessment is the abrogation ofjoint and several
liability.
C. Indivisibility
One final problem with regard to causation is the unwarranted fo-
cus on the indivisibility of the harm caused by concurrent tortfeasors. In
determining whether a single independent tortfeasor should be held
jointly and severally liable for the acts of all, it has been said that "the
true distinction to be made is between injuries which are divisible and
those [which] are indivisible." 15' For harm which is "indivisible," the
under the heading of "Release"). In the first two examples, much more could be done
both domestically and internationally to bring elusive parties to justice. In the third exam-
ple, courts already have gone far in developing theories of alternative liability. These the-
ories could be expanded. Assistance could be provided in the fourth example, but it
would be an admittedly expensive proposition with uncertain results. As to the last two
examples, little or nothing can be done to prevent the actor from being unavailable.
Responsible actor insolvent. For those instances in which a person is truly without money
or assets, nothing can be done. But there are numerous cases where bankruptcy laws,
corporate veils, and property owner protection laws render a person with some or all of
the necessary assets "judgment-proof" for purposes of enforcing a judgment. For "non-
deep-pocket" individuals, personal insurance policy limits often represent the extent of
their effective liability exposure.
Responsible actor settled. This area is perhaps the ripest for reform, and is discussed
supra notes 89-101 and accompanying text under the heading of "Release."
This article does not advocate all of these changes. Indeed, the authors would con-
sider some of them to be inadvisable. The policy arguments against them may be so
strong as to outweigh those in favor of the uncompensated victim. The purpose of this
note is simply to point out that there are many instances where the "judgment-proof"
defendant is able to pay, even though the legal system is presently powerless to make him
pay.
148. There are means other than tort law through which injured parties may be com-
pensated. See discussion of suggested reform infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., U.S. Reinsurance Market Reaction to the U.S. Civiljstice System, White Paper
by the Reinsurance Association of America, at 48 (March, 1986); AIA Memorandum, supra
note 12, at Discussion Paper, p. 4 ("Individual insureds must be measured on their indi-
vidual capabilities and risk potential. It is only under a system of several liability ... that
this can be accomplished").
150. See sources cited supra note 149; see also 1985 Insurance Hearings, supra note 11; 1986
Insurance Hearings, supra note 7.
151. Jackson, supra note I, at 406; see also Prosser, supra note 1, at 442.
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liability will be joint and several.1 5 2 This rule is based on the reasoning
that harm which is indivisible leaves no logical basis for apportion-
ment.153 Such tortured analysis has survived unchallenged far too long.
It does not follow that simply because the harm is indivisible there is
no basis for apportionment. It is the responsibility for causing the harm
which should be the focus of the inquiry. 154 The distinction between
"harm" and "responsibility for causing that harm" is in some cases com-
pletely lost and hopelessly confused. 15 5 Indeed, it is something of a
contradiction in terms to speak of a harm which is divisible. If injury is
capable of division, then in reality there are two separate injuries.
It has been said that there are two basic categories of indivisible
injuries. The first is injury incapable of theoretical division; the second,
although theoretically divisible, is injury incapable of apportionment. 1
5 6
A discussion of a classic example of the distinction may prove helpful.
Two negligent defendants, acting independently with separate guns,
shoot the plaintiff, wounding her in two different places. 15 7 If she dies,
the harm is said to be indivisible because there is no logical basis for
dividing death.1 58 If she lives, however, the harm is said to be divisi-
ble,' 59 even though certain elements of the damages, such as pain and
suffering, are difficult to apportion.1 60
In both of these examples there exists a logical basis for apportion-
ment. That basis is the responsibility of the defendant for bringing about
the result. Lack of ability to apportion damages, based on the indivisi-
bility of harm, is not a sound argument for retaining joint and several
liability. It is the ability to allocate responsibility for that harm which is the
key. Where that allocation is impossible, alternative liability theories
still provide a mechanism for resolving the case.
VII. RELATED PROBLEMS: RELEASE OFFSETS AND THE "EMPTY CHAIR"
Another major problem in addressing the law related to joint
152. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 347; Recent Developments, supra
note 1, at 157; SPEISER, KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 35, § 3.7, at 400; HARPER, JAMES &
GRAY, supra note 33.
153. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 347.
154. This is the approach taken by the Product Liability bill which recently passed the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. SENATE COMM. ON COM-
MERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No.
422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1986) (majority views).
155. See, e.g., 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE § 122, at 318 (6th ed. 1913); Recent
Developments in Joint and Several Liability, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1319, 1321 (1973). Similar
problems are noted in this excerpt from a discussion on concurrent torts: "recovery was
allowed because the plaintiff suffered an 'indivisible injury' [i.e., harm] for which there was
no logical basis for apportionment. Each actor was responsible for part of the damage but
it was impossible to tell how much."
156. Recent Developments, supra note 1, at 132.
157. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 1, § 52, at 345.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. But note that regardless of Prosser's seeming preference for a contrary result,
the defendants contributing to the non-fatal wounding could still be held jointly and sever-
ally liable in jurisdictions where the doctrine is still applied.
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tortfeasors is the fact that many times one of the responsible actors
never makes it to court. This is an issue that must be addressed in any
comprehensive reform.
A. Release Offsets
Although an offsetting credit is appropriately allowed in cases
where a defendant or potential defendant is released by the plaintiff fol-
lowing a settlement, 161 the manner in which the offset is calculated can
result in inequitable treatment of the remaining defendants. In many
jurisdictions, the offset is calculated by simply deducting the amount of
the settlement from the final award. 162 When a release is given for a
reason other than settlement, such as a gratuitous release based on a
plaintiff's relationship with a potential defendant, there is no offset even
though the person released is responsible for a substantial percentage of
the harm. This result is inequitable. Whenever the plaintiff releases one
of several potential tortfeasors for any reason, the ultimate judgment
should be reduced and the correct offset calculation should be based on
the settler's percentage of responsibility in causing the harm.
Two arguments against this approach are readily apparent: (1) it
would be difficult for the trier of fact properly to assign the correct per-
centage of responsibility to a person not a party to the case; and (2) it
would discourage settlements. With respect to the former, sufficient in-
centive exists for the remaining parties to argue vigorously the relative
responsibility of the person released. The trier of fact should determine
the settler's responsibility for the limited purpose of allocating responsi-
bility. The settling party could be called as a witness or be asked to
produce evidence even though liability could no longer attach due to the
release. As long as the evidence can be presented to the trier of fact,
and the incentive for fully developing that evidence remains intact, allo-
cating responsibility to a "nonparty" should not present a substantial
problem.
The second argument is a matter of policy. Out-of-court settle-
ments are clearly preferred to the costly, time-consuming, and uncertain
process of litigation. From the government's perspective, settlements
relieve the congested judicial system of time-consuming cases. From the
plaintiff's perspective, a settlement provides a sum certain now, without
the time, expense, and uncertainty involved in litigation. From the de-
fendant's perspective, settlement limits an otherwise uncertain liability.
These legitimate policy goals would not be affected by adopting the
"percentage of responsibility" offset approach recommended in this ar-
ticle. Although it is conceded that some settlement agreements made at
the expense of parties not privy to the negotiations may indeed be dis-
161. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Arkansas Kraft Corp. v. Johnson, 257 Ark. 629, 519 S.W.2d 74 (1975);
Greier v. Wikel, 4 Kan. App. 2d 188, 603 P.2d 1028 (1979); Deal v. Madison, 576 S.W.2d
409 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976).
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couraged, the authors argue that this would produce a more equitable
result in those cases.
A settlement is a trade-off. In exchange for swift and certain com-
pensation, the plaintiff waives his right to attempt to extract, through
litigation, a potentially larger but less certain judgment. The basic con-
cept of settlement would remain unchanged under the "percentage of
responsibility" offset approach outlined above.
When multiple defendants are involved, the plaintiff sometimes en-
joys a settlement "windfall" of sorts when the "amount of settlement"
offset approach is employed. 16 3 The plaintiff can receive a sum certain
portion of compensation now, without waiving his right to pursue the
larger judgment he initially sought. Thus, in cases involving multiple
tortfeasors, the plaintiff has an additional incentive to settle with at least
one of the tortfeasors since he loses nothing. Settling with only one of
them, however, does not further any policy objective. The case lives on.
The judicial system is still bogged down; the plaintiff essentially gives up
nothing, and the remaining defendants are subject to liability not only
for their own actions, but for those of the settling parties. Contribution
actions often are not available to correct this inequity even when the
settling party is solvent.1
6 4
Settlement between any one of several potential defendants and the
plaintiff should be driven on its own merits, the same as in cases involv-
ing a single tortfeasor. Under the "percentage of responsibility" offset
approach suggested here, there would be no additional disincentives in
cases involving multiple tortfeasors.
B. The "Empty Chair"
When a person responsible for a portion of the harm caused cannot
be brought into the suit, many courts do not recognize the absent party
which is commonly referred to as the "empty chair."' 165 As a general
rule, only parties to the transaction should be considered in apportion-
ing responsibility. If a person who is responsible for a portion of the
harm is not brought into a suit, the litigant in the best position to join
such person in the lawsuit but who fails to do so, should assume the
unnamed but partially liable person's percentage of responsibility. This
163. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.5, at 264.
164. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2504 (Supp. 1978) ("release . . . given . . . to
one of two or more persons . . . does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors [and iut
discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution"); IOWA
CODE § 668.7 (1979) ("release . . . discharges that person from all liability for contribu-
tion, but it does not discharge any other persons liable upon the same claim"); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. 507:7h (1974) ("release . . . discharges that person . . . from all liability for
contribution, but it does not discharge any other person liable upon the same claim"); and
WYo. STAT. § 1-1-113 (1977) ("release ... does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors
* . . and [iut discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribu-
tion"). But cf. IDAHO CODE § 6-806 (1979) (release . . . does not relieve him from liability to
make contribution ... unless ... [it] provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata
share of the released tortfeasor") (emphasis added); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-43
(1977) (similar to Idaho).
165. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 27, § 16.5, at 263.
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would help insure either that all responsible parties are brought into the
suit, or that the percentage of responsibility allocable to any unnamed
responsible persons is taken into account. If a person is not brought in
because of plaintiff's release, then the plaintiff. should accept responsi-
bility for the released person's percentage of responsibility.
However, if the defendant fails to bring in a potentially liable per-
son through available impleader practices or other procedures, he has
no one to blame but himself. When the "empty chair" is the result of
the defendant's failure to bring in a responsible person, that person's
percentage of fault should not be considered by the trier of fact. The
defendant is often in the best position to know who the other responsi-
ble actors are, and thus it is reasonable that he bear the burden ofjoin-
ing other potential tortfeasors.
There remains to be considered the "empty chair" problem which
develops when, regardless of the best efforts of either plaintiff or de-
fendant, the "person"' 16 6 responsible cannot be brought before the
court.' 6 7 Analytically, the empty chair problem presents the same di-
lemma presented in the case of a truly insolvent defendant. The respon-
sible person is judgment-proof, and we are left to decide who is to
shoulder his burden. It is unjustifiable to require the remaining defend-
ants to shoulder the burden of the insolvent tortfeasor. They should not
be required to pay for harm they are able to prove has been caused by
another person who, through no fault of the remaining defendants, can-
not be brought before the court. As discussed below, options other than
the tort system are available to compensate the plaintiff when this type
of "empty chair" problem exists.
VIII. SUGGESTED REFORM
To summarize the basic provisions which should be included in
joint and several liability reform legislation, 168 some of the issues set
forth above are revisited in the following discussion.
A. Operative language
The operative language abrogating joint and several liability should
consist of a simple across-the-board abrogation, with the exception of
cases involving concerted action. It is important to include a clear statu-
tory definition of "concerted action" in order to give the courts and par-
ties proper guidance. Such a definition should require that the actors
consciously work together, intending to do the wrongful act which
166. For convenience of discussion, the term "person" as used in this context also
would be applicable to acts of God.
167. For examples of empty chair problems see supra note 147, which also discusses
ways to deal with the problem outside of the joint and several liability context.
168. For an example of a specific joint and several liability reform legislation incorpo-
rating the provisions urged in this article, see Amendment No. 2844 to S. 2760, 99th
Cong. 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc., S12852 (Sept. 17, 1986) (amendment proposed by Sena-
tor Pressler); see also S. 217, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (TheJoint and Several Liability
Tort Reform Act of 1987 as introduced by Sen. Pressler Jan. 8, 1987).
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causes the harm. For example, liability for two negligent component
manufacturers normally would be several if they acted independently.
However, if they agreed to "cut corners" to come up with a cheaper
product, they would have acted in concert and should be jointly liable.
For all multiple torts independently committed, liability should be
several, not joint. Liability should be equated with apportioned respon-
sibility. There are numerous other options the reform-minded legisla-
tor might consider, but all are similarly plagued with either theoretical
problems of justification, or practical problems in implementation, or
both. 169
169. Some examples of alternative reform approaches and a short discussion of each
follows:
Limited to noneconomic damages. This approach retains joint and several liability for eco-
nomic damages such as pain and suffering. See, e.g., California Proposition 51; S. 2760,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 308 (1986). The object of this alternative is to make plaintiff whole
in an economic sense, while limiting other defendants' joint liability to objectively deter-
mined damages. Although there exists a clear policy rationale for the distinction, there is
scant theoretical justification for differentiating liability based on the type of damage in-
volved. This approach represents a political compromise.
Threshold percentage requirement. This approach allows for the abrogation of joint and
several liability, contingent upon the defendant falling below some threshold percentage
requirement after which joint and several liability would be invoked. For example, if the
threshold were set at twenty-five percent, a defendant whose responsibility was less than
twenty-five percent would be severally liable. Those whose responsibility is in excess of
twenty-five percent would be jointly and severally liable. See, e.g., supra note 29 (New
Hampshire fifty percent threshold). The idea behind this approach is to prevent the most
egregious applications of joint and several liability involving deep-pocket defendants
whose contribution in causing the harm is slight. The problem with such an approach is
that the threshold percentage figure is purely arbitrary. Also, juries might tend to simply
assign a higher percentage to the deep pocket than would otherwise be the case in an
attempt to compensate the plaintiff.
Defendant's responsibility compared to plaintiff s. This approach involves a comparison of
the responsibility of the plaintiff to each defendant. If the defendant's responsibility is
greater than the plaintiff's, he is jointly and severally liable. If the defendant's responsibil-
ity is less than that of the plaintiff's, he is severally liable. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 41.141(3) (1986). While theoretically justifiable, the jury again might be led toward re-
sult-oriented determinations regarding the allocation of responsibility.
Plaintiff's conduct. This approach retains joint and several liability when the plaintiff is
completely innocent. In cases involving contributory negligence on the part of the plain-
tiff, however, the liability of the defendants will be several. See, e.g., Boyles v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co., 619 P.2d 613 (Okla. 1980). Thus, the application of joint liability is
contingent upon the conduct of the plaintiff. Although a rational approach, it involves
exactly the same problems found in the old contributory negligence rule in that plaintiffs
clearly contibutorily negligent were found to be completely innocent in order to avoid
barring any recovery. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
Other defendants'conduct. This approach compares each individual defendant's percent-
age of responsibility with that of the other tortfeasors. A defendant is jointly liable only
with those defendants whose apportioned responsibility is less than his. See, e.g., Mo. REV.
STAT. § 538.230(2) (Cum. Supp. 1987).
Judgment-proof defendants. This approach is directed at the allocation of a judgment-
proof defendant's liability. Joint and several liability is retained, but the plaintiff has an
obligation to use his best efforts to collect individually each defendant's apportioned share
of liability, rather than allowing him to collect the lump sum from any of the defendants,
leaving them to initiate contribution actions against the remaining defendants. If, after
using best efforts, the plaintiff is unable to collect from a judgment-proof defendant, that
defendant's share is reallocated among all responsible parties, including the plaintiff,
based on their apportioned responsibility. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
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B. Burdens of Proof
There should be no burden of proof as to apportionment of respon-
sibility. It should be left to the trier of fact to make its best estimate
based on the evidence presented. Apportionment need not be reducible
to an exact mathematical computation.'
70
C. "Empty Chair" Problems
As a general rule, only parties to the case should be considered in
apportioning responsibility. This policy is to ensure that the trier of fact
has the benefit of the best evidence available. However, in those cases
where the plaintiff chooses to release persons who are potentially liable,
or where it is impossible for a defendant to implead a responsible party,
those parties should be considered in allocating responsibility.
D. Offsetting Adjustments for Release
When the plaintiff releases a defendant or potential defendant, the
final award accordingly should be offset by the percentage of responsi-
bility, as opposed to settlement dollar amount, attributable to that de-
fendant or potential defendant.
E. Policy Considerations
Anyone attempting to articulate specific reform proposals immedi-
ately confronts an insoluble policy dilemma. Some substantially inno-
cent parties will suffer. The reason for this sad state of affairs is that the
doctrine ofjoint and several liability makes a difference only when a true
wrongdoer is judgment-proof. If all responsible parties had money, the
difference between right of contribution (the present alternative to sev-
eral liability) and pure several liability (the approach advocated here)
would be one largely of administrative convenience and efficiency.'
7 '
The limitations of any reform effort must be realized with frustrat-
ing clarity. The goals of the reform effort then come into sharper focus,
as we realize that we can never reasonably expect to bring complete jus-
tice to this area of the law. The best that can be hoped for is to minimize
the injustice to both plaintiffs and defendants. The issue, then, boils
down to two fundamental questions. First, upon whom do we place the
burden of responsibility for the wrongful act of a judgment-proof third
party? Second, what is the most efficient means of accomplishing this
task? There is no "right" answer to the first question. The policy deci-
sions which flow from this analysis are necessarily laden with strong
§ 2(d), 12 U.L.A. 38 (Cum. Supp. 1987). This relatively mild reform is an improvement,
but it fails to address the crux of the issue.
"'Crisis ensitive'" reform. This approach limits reform efforts to specific classifications of
defendants, such as municipalities or public entities generally, or to specific types of ac-
tions, like product liability or medical malpractice. See, e.g., S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 308 (1986) (reform limited to product liability actions).
170. See discussion of burdens of proof, supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., LANDES & POSNER, supra note 127, at 529.
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philosophical prejudices, and the resolution of both questions is
uniquely political.
As has been illustrated previously, it is no longer possible categori-
cally to answer the first question based on the "innocence" of the plain-
tiff. At first blush, it might seem that if the plaintiff - who may or may
not be at fault - is to shoulder the burden of the missing third person's
responsibility, liability should be several. If it is to fall on the shoulders
of independent defendants who already have paid for their apportioned
share of responsibility, liability should be joint and several. Still, the
inquiry must go deeper. Regardless of how the first question is an-
swered, the second question regarding efficiency inevitably should lead
to a pure several liability approach.
Under today's system ofjoint and several liability, the liability of the
missing third person is generally borne by some deep-pocket defendant
who then distributes the loss throughout society. The cumbersome and
costly legal process necessary for this system to work is expensive in
terms of both time and money, making it grossly inefficient.172 Add to
that the artificial market distortions caused by deep-pocket defendants
passing costs on to consumers, and the system quickly becomes difficult
to defend - at least if one accepts the proposition that deep-pocket de-
fendants, such as manufacturers, insurance companies, municipalities,
and large corporations, are capable of passing the costs on to unrelated
third persons such as consumers and taxpayers.
Even if the answer to the first question involves a conscious policy
decision to compensate the plaintiff, that goal could be met much more
efficiently through the adoption of several liability supplemented by
some type of compensation system other than tort litigation. Examples
include a national insurance plan or a "tort trust fund" approach. 173
These could be administered much more cheaply and efficiently than the
present system and would ensure that the plaintiff is fully compensated.
The several liability approach places greater emphasis on individual
responsibility,174 times. Logically, it also would lead to greater efforts
toward punishing the true wrongdoer.1
7 5
172. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, THE UNIFORM
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, S. REP. No. 918, 98th Cong., 2d. Sess. 7 (1984) (majority views);
("for every $59 that is paid to claimants in product liability cases, $99 is paid for legal
services," not including court and other administrative costs); see also LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 127, at 529 (discussing the relative inefficiency of contribution actions).
173. This approach is not necessarily urged here. The point is that there are much
more efficient means other than the tort system to compensate an injured party when the
wrongdoer is found to bejudgment-proof. Detailed discussions of alternatives may prove
to be fertile ground for future articles.
174. It should be remembered that this does not leave the plaintiff unable to protect
himself. First, the remaining tortfeasors are liable severally for the portion of the harm for
which they are responsible. In addition, the harsh results of this rule inevitably would lead
to greater reliance upon individual liability insurance, which should be considerably easier
to afford.
175. Pure several liability would place greater emphasis on holding the true wrongdo-
ers responsible. Under the present system, deep-pocket defendants become proxies for
the "judgment-proof" wrongdoers, often as a matter of convenience rather than necessity.
"Judgment-proof" can mean many things. The party may be immune; the court may not
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IX. CONCLUSION
The theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine of joint and several
liability, as applied to concurrent torts, have been eroded gradually by
parallel developments in the law. Except for cases involving concerted
action, the doctrine should be abrogated. In its stead should be insti-
tuted a system of pure several liability, based on the common sense ap-
portionment of each wrongdoer's responsibility.
This system would not be perfect. Apportionments are not reduci-
ble to exact mathematical computations. Undoubtedly, there would be
cases where justice may be better served under the present system.
There is no "right" answer. The issue involves a fundamental policy
question of who should shoulder the burden of actions for which a third
party is responsible. Faced with that question, the result will never lead
to perfect justice. The goal of the reform urged herein is to minimize
the injustice. At one point in our legal history, joint and several liability
may have served that purpose better than the approach suggested in this
article. But in the wake of developments such as comparative fault, al-
ternative liability and jury apportionment of damages, that no longer is
the case.
Originally joint and several liability was applied to punish the
wrongdoer and protect the innocent plaintiff. Today, the true wrong-
doer often escapes all liability because the focus is on the deep pocket;
the compensated plaintiff no longer is always innocent; and the substan-
tially innocent third parties, or more likely consumers and taxpayers
who are completely innocent and totally unrelated to the case, ultimately
pay the bill for all of them. "This all goes to show that a rule of law
applied without regard to its reason may become a rule of injustice." 1
76
have proper jurisdiction; a proper defendant may be "insolvent;" he may be uninsured; his
insurance company may be "bankrupt;" or, as a practical matter, his assets may not be
worth pursuing because they are too difficult to liquidate. All of these factors make it
much simpler for the court or plaintiff or defendant seeking contribution to focus on the
deep pocket with ready cash. Indeed, one judgment required that "'recovery of contribu-
tion be limited to recovery from [third-party defendant's] insurer to the extent of...
coverage ...and that no contribution be recoverable from [third-party defendantl individuallyv. "
Ambri: v. Kress, 148 Cal. App. 3d 963, 970 n.5, 196 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 n.5 (1983) (quoting
the judgment) (emphasis added).
More emphasis needs to be placed on punishing the wrongdoer rather than limiting
liability to insurance coverage. Pure several liability would force parties, courts, and legis-
latures to go beyond the insurance companies and paper corporations, and collect for the
heretofore "uncollectables" as an alternative to not compensating the plaintiff.
176. WIGMORE, supra note 58, at 460.
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